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In the transition from the centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
rural development, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam established a nominal state - 
but de facto private - land ownership. As a result, both new landlessness and 
inefficient land-holding immediately appeared. How to prevent these problems 
while still achieving market-oriented rural development? The Chinese model - 
a third way between the centrally planned economy and free market system - 
provides a useful example, which may be relevant not only to these three 
countries as well as Myanmar and North Korea, but also to many other 
economies.1
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The Establishment of a Nominal State - But De-Facto Private - Land 
Ownership in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
Among the 19 rice-based economies in monsoon Asia, Cambodia, China 
(mainland), Laos, Myanmar, North Korea and Vietnam are under public (state 
or collective) land ownership1. In the transition from the centrally planned 
economy to a market-oriented rural development, Cambodia (1981), Laos (1988) 
and Vietnam (1993) have founded a nominal state - but de facto private - land 
ownership.
In Cambodia, agricultural cooperatives under the rigid centrally planned 
economy were replaced in 1979 by krom samaki (solidarity groups), each 
composed of 10-15 households, with three different classes. In class 1, 
production was fully collectivized. Whether they were shirking or working hard, 
members could gain the produce according to the man-days they worked. In 
class 2, major means of production were collectively owned, but only limited 
work was conducted collectively. Land was divided into parcels allocated on a 
family basis corresponding to the number of family members, and managed by 
families. In class 3, land officially belonged to the state but all the other means 
of production were privately owned, and families were engaged wholly in 
individual production. While in 1981, 20 % of the krom samaki were in class 
1, and 60 % in class 2, in 1989, almost 90 % were in class 3. In the same year, 
it also was decided to abandon the krom samaki. Rural residential land was 
turned to private ownership and could be sold and bought; farmland belonged 
to the state but possession was given to peasant households with tax to be paid 
for using it; if a farmland was not used for one year, the authorities could take 
it away; the possession of farmland was also salable and farmland could be 
converted into residential land, both subject to the approval of government 
offices. (Summers 1997: 187. Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 87-90)
Laos halted the new establishment of agricultural cooperatives in 1979, 
and abandoned them in 1986. In 1988, long-term usufructuary rights to land 
were granted to peasant households, inheritable and salable to natural and legal 
persons. This was confirmed in the 1991 new constitution which also made clear 
that all land belongs to the state. (Gainsborough 1997: 538-539. Kirk 1996: 
108). Any land left idle could in theory be recovered by the village chief and 
reallocated, on a temporary basis, to another family. Since 1993, the state has 
required that villages pay land tax in cash, refusing the traditional payments in 
paddy. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 14-15)
In Vietnam, before 1979, a workpoints system was carried out in 
agricultural cooperatives which resulted in equalitarianism rather than incentives. 
In that year, it was supplanted by a system of contracting output quotas to
1 For a general analysis of monsoon Asia rice-based economies, including the arguable 
superiority of the Chinese model of rural development based on public land ownership to the 



























































































households and linking the fulfillment with workpoints which were then linked 
to remuneration. In order to reach equality regarding land quality, quantity and 
distance, land given to households was fragmented (which was not necessarily 
consolidated in the later reforms). The tenure length was three to 15 years. By 
1988, it was further replaced by a system of contracting output quotas to 
households, leaving the total residuals to them without the involvement of 
workpoints. In 1988-89, the compulsory state procurement quotas were displaced 
by a land tax of 10 % of normal output (average in the past) and land use rights 
were given for 15 years to households which agreed their own contracts for sale 
for whatever crops they chose to cultivate. (Demaine 1997: 1057. Hayami 1994: 
1, 9-10, 13, 19). The 1993 Land Law declared that all land was formally owned 
by the state but households were given land use rights (Article 1) which were 
further exchangeable, transferable (salable), leasable (maximum three years 
normally - Article 78), inheritable, and mortgageable for loans (Article 3). The 
local administrations (such as the people’s committee of communes and districts) 
were supposed to judge the need for land sellers or lessors to reduce their land 
holdings and also to assess the capacity of buyers or lessees to use the increased 
holdings efficiently (Hayami 1994: 14-15). The limit of agricultural land-holding 
for annual crops by each household was 3 ha (Article 44). The use period was 
20 years for planting annual crops and aquaculture, 50 years for perennial crops, 
and renewable if lawfully used (Article 20). If the land was not used for one 
year, it could be withdrawn by the state (Article 26). If the state needed to 
recover land for the public interests, compensation would be given to the 
households affected (Article 27). (LLV 1993: 40, 43, 45, 49, 56). In order to 
record and protect private land use rights, the government has been conducting 
a nationwide cadastral survey and land registration and begun to issue Land Use 
Right Certificates (LURC). But this would need 15 years to complete and is 
extremely costly. (Hayami 1994: 9, 12)
Because in these three countries, since the new land tenure reforms, the 
state-owned farmland could be used just as private land, there is no state 
compulsory procurement quota, the possession of land could be sold and bought 
like private property, and in Cambodia residential land became privately owned 
and salable, such land use rights have "become little different from private land 
property rights in modern market economies in their effects on resource 
allocations, even though ‘state ownership of land’ is maintained" (Hayami 1994: 
9).
However, the designers and advocates of such a nominal state - but de- 
facto private - land ownership either did not expect or excluded the ensuing 
problems, especially the following two.
I. New Landlessness in the Low Wage Economy.




























































































infrastructure, diversified cropping2, non-crop agriculture3, and off-farm 
employment4 not yet developed, peasants can find few employment 
opportunities in non-grain production. Thus their income is very low. In such 
a low wage economy, their ability to cope with problems in production and 
living is also very weak. The permission to sell state-owned but individually 
possessed land opened up the possibility that peasants might be forced to sell 
land to deal with natural disasters, diseases, debts (including gambling losses) 
and other difficulties, or be induced to sell land to industrial and urban 
developers/dwellers in order to earn easy and high short-term profits, thus 
becoming newly landless.
Most rural areas of these three countries are still in the low wage 
economy. Moreover, when the agricultural cooperatives were abolished, so were 
their services and support to individual households, which led to single 
individual household operation that was weak when peasants were still poor. The 
difficulties they met in single operation strengthened the necessity for them to 
sell land, thus becoming newly landless.
For example, in Cambodia, agriculture remains the mainstay of the 
economy. Employment opportunities outside agriculture are extremely limited. 
Agriculture itself is dominated by rice subsistence farming. Production is 
vulnerable in adverse weather conditions. Irrigation systems remain largely 
inoperable. 38 % of households were below the poverty line in 1996. Cambodia 
is one of the poorest countries in Asia and the world. (FAOAVFP 1996: 2)
When krom samaki were abolished, land was distributed to member 
households according to their family size at that time and was to be registered 
at the district land office. Under the new system, privately owned residential 
land could be sold and bought with the permission of the district land office. 
State-owned but privately possessed farmland could also be sold and bought, 
and converted into residential land, with the permission of the provincial land
2 Diversified cropping implies a shift from a monoculture or a few crops (mainly grains) 
to a larger assortment of crops (roots and tubers, pulses, oil crops, vegetables, fruits, berries, 
treenuts, etc.) (Oshima 1993: 125. FAO-YP 1993: iv).
3 Agriculture in a broad sense includes cropping (farming), animal husbandry, fishery, 
forestry and hunting (Oshima 1993: 152), and in a narrow sense only refers to cropping 
(farming). Thus non-crop agriculture means animal husbandry, fishery, forestry and hunting 
(the importance of hunting has been declining due to environmental protection).
4 Off-farm employment of farm families denotes their employment in nonagricultural 
sectors, i.e., industry and services. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction, 
public utilities, transportation and communication. Services comprise banking, real estate, 
public services which require the highest level of education and retail trade, restaurants, 





























































































office. But the management of land by the authorities was not serious. Some 
people tried to record more land than they had and when the officers came to 
check, they borrowed others’ land temporarily. Many peasants got farmland 
without registering it with the district land office at all so as not to pay the 
registration fee. Even so, they could still sell their possessed land with the 
signatures of the local authority. In one case, a poor woman’s farmland was 
partially occupied by her neighbors, but she could not win justice from the 
village committee because she could not afford to invite the officers for meals 
and drinks. Hence the superficial and arguably chaotic land management in the 
young Cambodian market economy after the abolition of the cooperatives. 
(Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 88-91)
Abolished with the krom samaki was also their support to individual 
households. Owing to the loss of men in the wars, women make up 54 % of the 
adult population over 15, head 20 % of rural households and hold possession 
title to substantial paddy land. Peasants in general do not want to sell land, as 
a group of women cried: "If I sell land, where shall I live?" (Summers 1997: 
189. Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 89-91)
But due to difficulties from weak individual land operation, poverty, 
illness, and even gambling losses, quite a few peasant families, especially those 
headed by widows, had to sell their possession of farmland. A widow sold land 
because her family could not afford to keep the land after three years’ bad rice 
yield and their income from fishing was not sufficient. Although sale of land 
formally requires all the relevant people’s signatures, this regulation seemed 
unimportant in practice. Owing to gambling losses, a man sold the possession 
of his family’s farmland even without informing his wife, although it had been 
registered under both of their names. There were also women who, due to 
marriage, separated from their parents but found that the latter refused to give 
them farmland owing to family unhappiness, so that they had to work as wage 
laborers in other farms. They all became newly poor landless. (Kusakabe; Wang 
& Kelkar 1995: 89-91)
On the other hand, there were people who sold residential land and 
possession of farmland along the roads at high prices to earn more money, and 
thus also joined the newly landless. They could not easily survive if they have 
spent the easy money while still having not found secure jobs in non-agricultural 
production which as yet is underdeveloped in the poor rural areas. A widow sold 
land and bought weaving machines to weave silk skirts to be sent to Phnom 
Penh for sale. But it was unclear how she and her family could live if market 
demand fell. (Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 89-91)
Similarly, in Laos, the agricultural sector is continuously vulnerable to 
adverse weather and pests. The country is land-locked, with a poorly developed 




























































































the more developed areas, especially the Vientiane Plain and the southern 
Mekong towns on one hand, and the rest of the country on the other, have 
increased since the reform of the late 1980s. Laos is also one of the poorest 
countries in Asia and the world. (Gainsborough 1997: 539)
Cultivable land is scarce, while population pressure is increasing. The 
early settlers and their heirs have occupied more land, leaving less or no land 
for the villages to distribute to the new families. Inheritance also made land 
more fragmented. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 11,17, 31). 
Because salability of land requires the individually possessed public land to be 
fixed to the possessors, officials have no means to take a part of land from those 
households possessing more public land and allocate it to those households 
holding less or no land below the subsistence level, or to consolidate fragmented 
parcels.
With the salability of the state-owned but individually possessed land, 
from 1993-94 on, property transactions near Vientiane mainly involved the sale 
of agricultural land, mostly along or near roads, to urban dwellers. Peasants with 
large land area (5 to 10 ha) have been able to sell at high prices, thus rapidly 
increasing their capital investment potential while still retaining sufficient 
agricultural land. In contrast, families with little land (1 to 2 ha) have been 
unable to sell any land and were having problems meeting their basic 
requirements on the farm as they were below the sustainability threshold. The 
social gap has been widening. In the present context of greater market 
integration and gradual economic opening up, they will probably find it difficult 
to avoid proletarianization or poverty. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & 
Phouangphet 1996: 16-18)
Land sale to urban dwellers was for high prices reflecting future industrial 
profits rather than agricultural earnings, thus those farmers who really needed 
land for survival could not afford to buy it at all. While few villages still have 
land to allocate to new population, the property market has absorbed a large 
land area. For example, in one village with 15 landless families and no land to 
allocate because there was not any left, no less than 75 ha have been sold in 
barely two years. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 17). 
Meanwhile, the obligation to sell land due to difficulties in the weak single 
household operation, natural disasters, diseases, debts, gambling losses, etc. has 
occurred.
As a result, landless families as a new category of inhabitants - 
agricultural proletariat - began to emerge in many villages. Around Vientiane, 
it accounted for about 10 % - 15 % of the total rural families. In one village, 
71.6 % of the households were landless. In another village, five families held 
no land but lived with their parents-in-law, who possessed a fair amount of land. 




























































































insufficient agricultural land for rent to alleviate the lack of appropriate land. 
Those who could not rent land had to rely exclusively on wage labor in the 
village or in Vientiane. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 11, 
23, 42)
In Vietnam, in 1994, 6.8 million or 17 % of labor force were either 
unemployed or underemployed. There are sharp contrasts in development 
between different regions, especially lowlands and uplands. Infrastructure is still 
backward. (Demaine 1997: 1056-1057, 1063). More than half the 75 million 
people still living under the poverty line, although major cities have become 
much richer (Economist 1997: 66). However, during 1988-94, over 2,950 
agricultural cooperatives (17.4 % of the total) had been dissolved. By the end 
of 1994, a total of 16,243 agricultural cooperatives still existed, covering about 
64 % of all farm households. But there were great differences in their 
operational performance. An estimated 15.5 % of them that had recorded good 
performance in the past ("good" cooperatives) were still able to provide 
necessary services to member households. "Middle" performing cooperatives 
accounted for 40.4 % of them and were mainly engaged in providing irrigation 
facilities and services. They did not have sufficient capital and funds to cover 
increased expenses, and many members have quit. Thus lots of them have 
become dormant and nominal. Non-operational ("bad") cooperatives accounted 
for 43.3 % of the total. Although the leadership of these cooperatives remained 
in place, they neither carried out economic activities nor provided any services 
to members. The management costs were mainly paid out of debt recovered 
from the members. In many regions, however, members refused to provide any 
additional funds. As a result, the number of "bad" cooperatives has been 
increasing. In the South, cooperatives have largely disappeared. The farm tasks 
that require group actions, such as irrigation management, have had to rely on 
voluntarily formed production teams, which appeared in both the North and 
South. (Harms 1996: 1-3. Hayami 1994: 11). Therefore, the majority of farm 
households are carrying out single household operation of land which is weak.
Under such circumstances, following the permission to sell the 
individually possessed state-owned land in 1993, newly landless has appeared 
too. In early 1997, the government raised its concern about this issue during a 
meeting of provincial leaders in the Mekong Delta. No official data relating to 
this situation is yet available, but a survey on the new landlessness in the 
Mekong Delta is being carried out. (Messier 1997). As a result, even Tran Due 
Luong, President of Vietnam, has conceded that economic reforms have 
produced only limited benefits for rural Vietnamese (Tran Due Luong 1998).
Hayami, however, has excluded the possibility of new landlessness and 
related trend of polarization, stating: "The highly polarized agrarian structure and 




























































































mainly as the result of colonial exploitation policies, including exclusive land 
allocations to colonial elites. This situation is diametrically different from that 
of Vietnam today. Therefore, it is not necessary to be overly concerned about 
such an inequitable agrarian structure emerging in this country”. (Hayami 
1994:15). But Hayami may not know that "the highly polarized agrarian 
structure and oppressive landlordism observed in some developing countries" in 
monsoon Asia had emerged well before the colonial era [e.g., before the late 
1940s they existed in Japan which was never colonized, in China for about 2000 
years which incorporated Vietnam in 112 BC for 1000 years (Smith 1997: 
1046), in Cambodia no later than the sixth century (Summers 1997: 176) and in 
Laos the eighth century (Stuart-Fox 1997: 532)]. The incorrectness of Hayami’s 
statement is also shown by the immediate appearance of the new landlessness 
after the setting-up of the nominal state - but de facto private - land ownership 
in these three countries although they are currently not colonized.
II. Inefficient Land-Holding in the High Wage Economy.
In monsoon Asia, once yields of rice and other grains are raised, and rural 
infrastructure, diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture, and off-farm 
employment developed, peasants can find sufficient employment in non-grain 
agriculture and off-farm lines. Their income is greatly increased and there is no 
need for them to rely on rice production. If land were fixed to the possessors, 
then, in such a high wage economy, there would be a tendency for the 
possessors to become part-time farmers and absentees and keep the land just as 
an asset without tilling it efficiently, nor selling and leasing it to the full-time 
farmers who wish to concentrate on rice production. Even in those rural areas 
which still remain in the low wage economy, many peasants may go to cities or 
other rural areas which have entered the high wage economy to earn more 
income, while still holding their land without efficient use and even leaving the 
land desolated. The newly rich peasants may change farmland into residential 
land for more housing. Urban developers, who have bought agricultural land 
when its prices were relatively low in comparison with its future prices, may 
leave the land idle for years without making construction, or repeatedly sell the 
land between speculators in expectation of continually higher prices.
For example, in Japan, the land reform during 1946-50 established a 
private land ownership with fragmented small farms: on average, the farm size 
was 0.8-1 ha, number of parcels per farm 10-20, and parcel size 0.06 ha, the 
total one way distance to parcels about 4 km. Land sale and lease, although 
allowed, were seriously restricted by a 3 ha ceiling on land holding, protection 
of tenants from eviction, and control of land rent at a very low level. The 
national rural cooperatives socialistically collectivized forward and backward 
services and financing for the individual farming units which could only control 




























































































wage economy. Peasants gained huge incentives for production. Through 
construction of rural infrastructure, higher yields and multiple cropping of rice 
and other grains, diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture, off-farm 
employment, peasant migration to cities and work in towns, full employment 
was realized and wages rose, which was followed by agricultural mechanization 
with small machinery. In 1960, rice self-sufficiency was achieved, the first 
transition (agriculture to industry) completed, labor shortages appeared, and the 
second transition (industry to services) started. In the high wage economy, the 
fragmented small farms should have been consolidated and expanded, so that 
large machinery could be used, labor saved, costs reduced and increasing returns 
to scale (up to an optimal size) gained. However, much land was held by part- 
time farmers and absentees with inefficient use, while the remaining full-time 
farmers could not get larger land to till and were thus difficult to survive.
Therefore, in the 1960s, the land holding ceiling was relaxed and land 
sale encouraged. From 1970 on, land rent control was removed, tenancy 
protection lifted and land lease promoted. But neither succeeded and the 
fragmented small farms structure remains. In 1995, of all farm households, full­
time households accounted for only 15.3 %, part-time 1 (mainly farming) took 
18.3 %, and part-time 2 (mainly on other jobs) 66.5 % (JSY 1997: 226). 
Utilization rate of cultivated land decreased from 133.9 % in 1960 to 99.3 % in 
1994 (JSY 1986: 159. JSY 1997: 235). The self-sufficiency rate of rice has been 
maintained by huge subsidies, but those of most other agricultural products have 
declined to below 100 % since the 1960s and all were so in 1994 (JSY 1993/94: 
272. JSY 1997: 276).
Taiwan Province of China and South Korea have simply repeated the 
Japanese model of rural development. (For a more detailed analysis on Japan, 
Taiwan Province of China and South Korea, and a new proposal for land 
consolidation and expansion under private land ownership, see Zhou, Jian-Ming 
1997.)
If the state-owned agricultural land were fixed to the individual possessors 
under weakly enforced regulations in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, then, once 
their rural areas have entered the high wage economy, inefficient land-holding 
would also happen. Actually, at least in Laos, this phenomenon has already 
appeared near cities where wages are much higher. It has been mentioned in the 
above that around Vientiane from 1993-94 on, following the salability of the 
state-owned but individually possessed land, much agricultural land, mostly 
along or near roads, was sold mainly to the rich urban dwellers. But much 
purchased land was just left idle. Although in theory unused land is to be 
withdrawn by the village, the mechanism to prevent inefficient land-holding and 
land desolation is neither sufficient, nor effective. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais 




























































































Hayami criticizes the 1993 Land Law of Vietnam for putting private land 
transactions under several regulations (such as the maximum ceiling on land 
holding, justification by local officials of the need for land sellers or lessors to 
reduce their land holdings and the capacity of buyers or lessees to use the 
increased holdings efficiently), on the grounds that in his judgement of the 
experiences of other countries, such regulations, once strongly enforced, became 
a source of extremely large inefficiency (e.g., in Japan) (Hayami 1994: 14-15).
However, Hayami does not note a dilemma: certain strongly enforced 
regulations or conditions in the land transaction market in the low wage 
economy may become a source of inefficient land-holding in the high wage 
economy; but without them, newly landless would appear in the low wage 
economy.
To such a dilemma, Hayami’s solution is that "The proper policy design 
should limit application of the regulations on land market to the cases in which 
significant externalities or social costs, such as water pollution, are involved. 
Land transactions involving no such costs to society should be approved 
automatically." (Hayami 1994: 2). In short, public land should first be solidly 
possessed by individuals, and then land transactions among individuals should 
not be restricted.
Hayami, however, does not realize that a free market system may not be 
able to resolve such a dilemma. As Gordillo de Anda argues, markets do not 
function by themselves. It is naive to assume that the removal of government 
interventions will result in reasonable approximations of perfect markets. It does 
not follow that social welfare will rise as a consequence of the removal of some 
or all government interventions. On the contrary, the impact of structural reform 
and liberalization has negatively affected the poorest. The virtues of the market 
are exaggerated in line with the vices of the state. Markets must be managed 
and market failures compensated for. For development to work, people have to 
feel that they directly benefit; and for that to work, there has to be a mix of 
market, civic society (such as farmers’ cooperatives or associations) and 
government. Each of these three parts needs the other parts. Such a mix could 
release something far more powerful than the energy of each: the synergy of 
"collective imagination and action" that results in sustainable development. 
(Gordillo de Anda 1997: 1-3, 7-8). Riddell further points out that "There exists 
a wide range of examples of public sector and private sector cooperation. The 
challenge that all nations are facing is to identify and implement solutions that 
respond to their own situation." (Riddell 1997: 2)
In fact, it was correct for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to abandon the 
centrally planned economy, but incorrect to turn to the opposite extreme - 
largely relying on free market forces and paying little (at least insufficient) 




























































































management and support by villages and cooperatives. Their experiences are 
important to Myanmar and North Korea since they have also adopted market- 
oriented rural development measures, although to distinctly different degrees.
The Constitution of Sep. 24, 1947 of Myanmar which gained 
independence on Jan. 4, 1948 established a state land ownership with the right 
of tilling land given to the actual tillers. They include mainly private individuals, 
but also state economic enterprises, cooperatives, domestic-foreign joint ventures 
and other organizations. Upon application by peasant households, village 
people’s councils allocated parcels of land to farmers with a maximum duration 
of 30 years, but renewable for lifetime, and decided who should till the land 
after their death. Thus small land-holders have been dominant. (Steinberg 1981: 
125. Silverstein 1997: 634-635. Steinberg 1987: 273. Kyi Win 1997)
During 1962-86, there was a compulsory state rice procurement quota 
system. In principle, the state had a monopoly of all major commercial sales of 
rice, inter-township paddy shipment, and exports. Quotas were set for 
procurement from individual farms. The farms could retain fixed amounts for 
home consumption plus a small amount for seeds and ceremonial activities, were 
required to sell most of the surplus up to the quotas to the state agency, and 
could then sell the residual to any individual consumer within the township (in 
specified rice surplus townships, also beyond the township). The state 
procurement prices, although raised several times, were generally lower than the 
market prices, hence a Two Track Price System for rice. During 1987-88, the 
state liberalized the marketing of rice, first by allowing cooperatives to operate 
alongside the state agency, and then, in September 1987, by opening trade to 
private agents. Their introduction, however, coincided with a decline in paddy 
production and a period of rapidly rising rice prices which contributed to 
growing unrest in urban areas in 1988. Thus, since 1989, the compulsory state 
rice procurement quota system has been reintroduced. In 1990-91, the state 
purchased about 15 % of total paddy output, cooperatives bought around 7 %, 
and the rest was open to private agents. Although the quota prices were lower 
than the market prices, the state provided fertilizer and credit at subsidized 
prices to farmers. (Steinberg 1981: 133. Steinberg 1987: 274. Vokes 1997: 646) 
Rice still dominates the economy, and is the main source of employment 
and principal export earner. Production is dependent on the weather. As a result, 
Myanmar remains one of the poorer countries in Asia. (Vokes 1997: 645-646). 
Its land tenure system (which is quite similar to the initial stage of the Chinese 
model, see below) has avoided new landlessness in the low wage economy, 
could control inefficient land-holding in the high wage economy, and has 
guaranteed a basic food security via the state compulsory procurement quota 
system. But it also is currently under revision in order to realize a more market- 




























































































In North Korea, agricultural land is either collectively owned (more than 
90 %) or state-owned. A centrally planned economy is still in place. In 1995-96, 
a new stress was made on transformation of collective farms to state ownership. 
Since 1991, output has declined and serious food shortages occurred, especially 
since 1993 due to flood damage (FEA 1995: 466. FEA 1997: 488). Rice was an 
important export commodity until the mid-1980s, but has to be imported, 
together with wheat, in the 1990s. A few signs of market-oriented reform have, 
however, also appeared. In 1994-96, emphasis was switched from heavy industry 
to agriculture, light industry and foreign trade. (Chung 1997: 481-483). In 1996, 
the state allowed 30 pyong (0.0099 ha; 1 pyong equals 3.3 square meters) for 
private backyard cultivation by each civilian household and 100 pyong (0.033 
ha) by a soldier’s family (Shim Jae Hoon 1996: 30). It was reported that 
massive collective farms have been reduced in size and some farmers permitted 
to plant crops twice a year (double-cropping) - a practice long forbidden. 
Peasants in the hard-hit northern provinces have been told to fend for 
themselves, allowing them to trade privately with China. With help from the UN 
Development Program, there have been a few scattered experiments, providing 
credit to individual households to buy chickens or goats and allowing them to 
sell eggs or milk on the open market. (Richburg 1997: 4)
Should Myanmar and North Korea follow Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
in establishing a nominal public - but de facto private - land ownership for a 
more market-oriented rural development?
In this regard, the China example may be relevant and significant. In the 
following analysis, four questions deserve attention, i.e., for a market-oriented 
rural development under public land ownership, whether (1) private land sale 
and mortgage, (2) strongly enforced conditions for land-holding for efficient use, 
(3) cadastral certification for a de facto private land ownership and (4) state 
compulsory procurement of quotas of grain, are necessary or not.
The Chinese Model
Similar to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, China started market-oriented 
rural development in 1978, still keeps public land ownership (although at village 
collective level) and allows peasant households to use the land. But China has 
pursued a third way between the centrally planned economy and free market 
system, implemented a mixed economy of governments, village and households, 
and consequently succeeded in solving the above-mentioned dilemma by both 
preventing new landlessness in the low wage economy and controlling 
inefficient land-holding in the high wage economy.
In China, mral land can be sold only with the state’s permission to public 
(usually urban) administration, which can then render or lease it for use by 
public or private domestic and foreign developers. Those peasants who have lost 




























































































no landlessness has appeared. For using collective agricultural land, households 
are required to sell certain major products in quota to the state and can dispose 
the surplus in the market (the Household Contract System). The market prices 
are usually higher than the quota prices, but after a very good harvest, may 
fluctuate toward lower than the pre-determined quota prices (hence a Two-Track 
Price System). The first round of contracts lasted for 15 years (1978-93), and 
the second 30 years (1994-2024), renewable. The village has the duty to fulfil 
the general management of the contract system and provision of services, thus 
a village-household dual level operation of land with the household as the basic 
level. The village also is responsible for managing social welfare, infrastructure 
construction, natural disaster control, overall rural development, etc.
Initially, under the Equal Land System, land was distributed on a per 
capita basis equally according to the quality, quantity and distance, resulting in 
numerous fragmented small farms. As population increased, parcels had to be 
readjusted to families, leading to increasingly fragmented smallness of farms and 
parcel insecurity. As the economy moved into the high wage stage following the 
increase of yields, development of rural infrastructure, diversified cropping, non­
crop agriculture and off-farm activities around 1984, part-time farmers and 
absentees appeared. They either only produced grain in quota, or simply bought 
grain in the market or paid cash for fulfilling the state procurement tasks, hence 
creating false output. They held land for inefficient use without the willingness 
to officially transfer or personally lease it to the remaining full-time farmers, 
although no land holding ceiling has been stipulated. The fragmented small 
farms could not be consolidated and expanded. In order to solve these problems, 
the Dual Land System and Single Land System, among other experiments in 
appropriate large-scale farming for more efficient land use, have been carried 
out, which are presented below, briefly due to the length limit of the paper.
Under the Dual Land System, land was divided into self-sufficiency land 
and responsibility land. Self-sufficiency land (grain-rations land) was equally 
contracted in compact form to households on a per capita basis for planting 
mainly grain for self-consumption. The use of the self-sufficiency land was 
almost free of charge as a basic social welfare. In general, the higher the degree 
of development of the village’s non-grain agriculture and off-farm production, 
the less the payment required for using the self-sufficiency land.
Responsibility land was contracted also in compact form on the conditions 
of fulfilling output quotas of the state, paying agricultural tax to the state and 
collective fees5. The contractors could dispose of the surplus products on the
5 According to a national sample survey on the state compulsory purchase system, grain 
sold at the quota prices, depending on places, took 13.5 %  - 21.6 % of the total grain output 




























































































market. In general, the higher the degree of development of the village’s non- 
grain agriculture and off-farm lines, the more competitive the distribution of the 
responsibility land. There were four basic categories.
Category 1: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
employment were little developed and peasants almost completely relied on 
grain production for living, responsibility land was equally contracted to 
households on a per capita basis.
Under the Equal Land System, the increase of population was actually 
encouraged and led to frequent land redistributions. Under the Dual Land 
System, the contracted land of each household was divided into two. The 
increase of population of a household would lead to the deduction of its 
responsibility land but an increment of its self-sufficiency land (children born 
beyond the family planning limit were not taken into account). The decrease 
would lead to the increment of its responsibility land but deduction of its self- 
sufficiency land. Thus, as the family size changed, the area and location of the 
household’s land kept the same, only the proportion of the two kinds of land 
was changed on the account. This was called the Dual Land on Account System. 
Households were thus encouraged to produce less children in order to get more 
responsibility land within their total contracted land so that they could produce 
more to sell in the market. The economies of scale of land would at least not be 
lowered due to further smallness and fragmentation and may even be raised. 
(Wang & Ma 1990: 34)
Category 2: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
employment were modestly developed, responsibility land was equally contracted 
to every labor force. Here, some laborers already worked in non-grain 
agriculture and off-farm lines. But jobs there were not secure, so that they were 
not yet willing to transfer their responsibility land. Such areas were richer than 
those in Category 1, thus non-laborers (the old, children, etc.) were only entitled 
to self-sufficiency land but not to responsibility land so as to make the use of 
the latter more efficient. As the responsibility land was distributed among less 
people, each laborer could equally get more land so that the economies of scale 
were raised. (Wang & Ma 1990: 34)
Some villages set up a reserve land for both overall rural development and 
newly increased population. To those households without laborers, if the 
population grew and their self-sufficiency land was not enough, a part of the 
reserve land could be given to the new population. (Zhang; Liu & Zhang 1989: 
34-36). To those households with laborers, the "Dual Land on Account System"
yuan per mu (0.0667 ha) in 1988, as up to about 4 % of the net income per mu (SYC 1989: 
174, 663. RCRD 1989). The collective fees should not exceed 5 % of last year’s per capita 





























































































Category 3: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
employment were fairly developed, responsibility land was equally contracted 
to every agricultural labor force (for grain production). That means those 
laborers having left grain agriculture but still holding their permanent residence 
in the village were no more entitled to responsibility land, although still to self- 
sufficiency land. (Those who had got permanent city residence were obviously 
not entitled to either self-sufficiency land or responsibility land.) Because only 
the remaining agricultural labor force could equally contract more land, the 
economies of scale and land use efficiency were further raised. (Wang & Ma 
1990: 34)
Here, for adjusting the ratio of self-sufficiency land to responsibility land 
of the households of agricultural labor force, the Dual Land on Account System 
could still be applied. To the households of non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
laborers, if their self-sufficiency land was not enough due to population growth, 
a part of the reserve land could be given.
Category 4\ In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
employment were highly developed, responsibility land was contracted to 
agricultural labor (for grain production) by competition of bidding. Here, 
because many peasants would like to concentrate on non-grain agriculture and 
off-farm activities to earn more income, it was possible for villages to contract 
the responsibility land to expert farmers. Only those who bid higher output 
could win the contract. The division of land was according to its suitability to 
a specific product (rice, cotton, etc.). Expert farmers, who could also be non­
villagers, were given land according to their relevant expertise and ability. 
Economies of scale of land and efficiency in land use were highly raised.
As the villages became rich, they could provide the newly increased 
population with food at quota prices, rather than giving them self-sufficiency 
land.
This was regarded as the optimal standard Dual Land System, for the self- 
sufficiency land was distributed equally as a back-up basic social welfare, but 
responsibility land was contracted through competition of bidding (Wang & Ma 
1990: 33-34).
The village may also lease land (usually reserve land) in compact form 
to expert farmers via bidding for higher monetary rent, rather than output. 
However, a certain type and amount of products (e.g., grain) were still required. 
The land under leasing was also a kind of responsibility land, hence a special 
form under the Dual Land System.
In order to implement the Dual Land System, it was necessary to actively 
educate villagers so as to obtain their majority agreement, and to oblige the few 
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